Overview of Event:
On the 27th December 2017 one of the hoarding lines measuring c68m in length and 2.25m high was blown over in high gusting winds. The hoarding was constructed using a proprietary plastic water-filled Safesite GB2 barrier system. The hoarding line runs along the pavement edge separating St Thomas St. and Costain’s Beazley House offices / Vinegar Yard compound.

No one was near the hoarding when it fell; there were no injuries. Although no one was in close proximity at the time of the incident, there was a risk to site personnel and members of the public.

General Key Messages:
- Hoardings are temporary works and as such must be subject to design and appropriate design reviews should be undertaken.
- Temporary works inspection regimes must be in place.
- Any wind speed restrictions must be noted on any designs and form part of the communication to the site teams.
- Weather conditions must be considered in the planning of works with suitable measures in place to react to predicted or actual conditions.

Causes:
Immediate - The immediate cause of the incident can therefore be attributed to a ‘gust’ of wind more than the manufacturers guidelines which applied a force to the hoarding causing it to blow over.

Root and Underlying Causes
- At the time of the incident it is unclear who within the delivery team had the responsibility to ensure the barrier bases were filled to the correct level.
- No one within the TWC (?)/ TWS (?) team was given complete accountability for hoarding checking. This has been delegated via word of mouth to the night shift and day shift TWS.
- The deputy TWS had conducted inspections albeit 3 weeks apart. Weekly inspections should have been completed by the section TWS as specified within the Costain How To. Two different TWS’s completed sporadic or adhoc inspections
- The Permit To Load had not been filled out fully to say who was responsible for inspections or how often. Frequency should be weekly.
- The TW Design team did not have time to ensure that all residual risks were noted as clearly as they should have been on the temporary works drawings or provided to the delivery team and subsequently briefed via the SOS and TBS process.
- The TW team carried out calculations based on a previously agreed hoarding design criterion and found that it was not sufficient to meet the required load cases.
- The Delivery team insisted that they wanted to use this system because it was easy for them to use. The site delivery team have ignored the recommendations issued by the TW Design team and further failed to act on the caveats stated on the Form 3.
- As the site changes the hoarding drawings and form 3 get revised weekly (usually with last minute requests from the Delivery Teams) FRM 001261 got to rev 22 in approx. 32 weeks. A more permanent system was required.

Actions Taken As a Result of the Investigations:
- Temporary Works Designers must not approve temp. works when the design is known to be flawed or incorrect/not suitable.
- An ITP should be dratted which supports the assurance and checking regime specifying what needs to be checked and when.
- Records of inspection and checking are to be maintained by the relevant TWS/ TWC.
- An individual within the temp. works deign team must be appointed to maintain a watching brief on weather conditions which may affect temp. works.