

Shared Learning

COSTAIN

The Thameslink Programme

Issue Date: 12th June 2017 - For further info contact sharon.fink@networkrail.co.uk

Issue Number: TLP077 Title: Debris Fell into Public Area

Overview of Event:

A small amount of cementitious debris (screed) fell from an overhead works area into a public area at London Bridge station (Joiner Street entrance). The work area is what was once the extension passageway for Platforms 1 and 2. Nobody was struck or otherwise injured. The work scope included the removal of existing floor and new surfacing. There was a downpipe cast into the slab however it was not visible from above in the work area due to bricks and screed having been laid over it. It was the action of the breaker chisel penetrating through the brick and screed layer and into the 'hole' of the top of the endless downpipe that provided the fall path for the debris.

General Key Messages:


- Compliance of permit conditions must be checked to provide assurance that these are being adhered to
- Change management processes must be clearly briefed and understood by those Supervising / undertaking the works

Photo of Event :

Location where debris fell



View up to Joiner St. Note downpipe through which the debris fell



Actions Taken As a Result of the Investigations:

- CREs briefed to communicate reason for requests for surveying to contextualise it. This will allow surveyors to better understand the potential risks. Survey manager briefed to brief the survey team as this requirement.
- Senior Manager 1-2-1s are being accelerated and particular attention paid to this area.
- Project Director and Construction Manager met to review programme and safety commitments.
- All Engineers and supervisors have received a briefing reminding them of their safety responsibilities.
- The Engineers concerned and the wider engineering community were engaged with a 'follow the process' message.
- WPP sign off process reviewed for re-sign off requirements when changes occur.

Causes:

Immediate Cause – Concrete debris fell through an uncharted downpipe into the public realm.

Underlying Causes

- Design/Procedure: Information on the Permit to Dig and drawings did not identify the downpipe through the soffit.
- Procedure: Supervisor and Engineer did not reassess the work when they were instructed by the Construction Manager (CM) to reschedule the from nightshift to dayshift. The CM believed that the Engineer and Supervisor would undertake a detailed risk assessment, including the Point of Work Risk Assessment [PoWRA]. He failed to check that the specific risks relating to undertaking the work on dayshift had been adequately identified and mitigated.
- Procedure: Critical control measures detailed in the Task Briefing Sheet [TBS], in particular the deployment of marshalled Exclusion Zone in Joiner Street and carrying out the work in station closure hours were not implemented.
- Procedure: The Engineer made revisions to the Task Briefing Sheet (TBS), however these were not comprehensive. An additional control measure to not work over Joiner Street was [correctly] included, the existing primary control measure to undertake the works in station 'out of hours' periods was not adequately dealt with.
- Organisation: Both of the Supervisors [activity and zone supervisors] did not adhere to the revised TBS, in particular to the prohibition on working with the breaker above Joiner Street. The Engineer returned to the works 2hrs later and works were being carried out over Joiner Street. He did not intervene due to perceived programme requirements.
- Procedure: The WPP, because of the station interface, initially required a Network Rail approval. Any subsequent significant change to the WPP and / or TBS required a further review by NR. This was not sought.